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history: Possibilities for critical 
accounting history research
Abstract: This essay, following up on the recent Sy and Tinker [2005] 
and Tyson and Oldroyd [2007] debate, argues that accounting history 
research needs to present critiques of the present state of account-
ing’s authoritative concepts and principles, theory, and present-day 
practices. It proposes that accounting history research could benefit 
by adopting a genealogical, “effective” history approach. It outlines 
four fundamental strengths of traditional history – investigate only 
the real with facts; the past is a permanent dimension of the present; 
history has much to say about the present; and the past, present, and 
future constitute a seamless continuum. It identifies Nietzsche’s ma-
jor concerns with traditional history, contrasts it with his genealogical 
approach, and reviews Foucault’s [1977] follow up to Nietzsche’s ap-
proach. Two examples of genealogical historiography are presented 
– Williams’ [1994] exposition of the major shift in British discourse 
regarding slavery and Macintosh et al.’s [2000] genealogy of the ac-
counting sign of income from feudal times to the present. The paper 
critiques some of the early Foucauldian-based accounting research, 
as well as some more recent studies from this perspective. It con-
cludes that adopting a genealogical historical approach would enable 
accounting history research to become effective history by presenting 
critiques of accounting’s present state.
INTRODUCTION
This essay contrasts two stereotypical genres of histori-
cal narratives – traditional and genealogical. Historians of the 
 traditional kind are concerned to uncover the truth about the 
past. This assumes that they have the confidence in their capac-
ity to find it and to recognize it when they see it. Genealogical 
acknowledgments: The author is indebted to the Social Science and Hu-
manities Research Council (Canada) for partial support for this research and to 
participants in the Accounting, Business, and Financial History Workshop, Car-
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historians, in contrast, reverse this stance. They do not want 
to know the truth about the past, but rather about the fictions 
of the present. They want to show how the “truth” is made, not 
discovered. In doing so, however, they do not want to show how 
the present is better than the past, thus revealing how western 
civilization has progressed with time. Instead, for genealogists, 
the present seems just as strange as the past. So instead of mak-
ing the present familiar and seeming natural and inevitable, they 
look for and document this strangeness. They produce a genea-
logical history that de-naturalizes and exposes its strangeness.
This essay can be seen as a follow up to the recent Tyson 
and Oldroyd (T&O) debate with Sy and Tinker (S&T). S&T 
[2005, p. 49] contend that because of “accounting history’s 
resolute adherence to empiricist, archival and otherwise an-
tiquarian epistemes … [it] has forfeited its opportunities to 
speak authoritatively from the past about problems that beset 
accounting in practice.” They see this as “a missed opportunity 
of tragic proportions for accounting historical research because 
it has undermined its authority to address problems in account-
ing practice and theory today” (p. 52). Thus, S&T argue, much 
accounting history research has failed to present critiques of the 
present state of accounting’s authoritative concepts, principles, 
theory, and present-day practices by retreating to the ideology of 
archivalist empiricism. Archivalists’ claims to independence and 
objectivity, they maintain, are unsupportable and fallacious; the 
truth is made not found, and facts are notoriously frail.1 Invok-
ing post-Khunian theory, they see accounting historians as pre-
senting conservative renditions which mask a latent, normative, 
political agenda. In contrast, “relevant history is history that 
speaks in a meaningful way to the quandaries of the present” (p. 
63). They gesture towards Marx and Engel’s theory of historical/
dialectic materialism for ontological and epistemological guid-
ance and call on the accounting historian to “align herself with 
that judged to be morally and socially appropriate” (p. 49).
T&O [2007] respond to S&T’s charge that accounting 
historians do not critique the present state of accounting due 
to their strict adherence to archivalist, objectivist epistemol-
ogy. They challenge S&T’s contention that Khunian and post-
Khunian paradigms have put paid to archivalism with its belief 
in objectivity and factualism. T&O see Kuhn’s epistemological 
1 As Nietzsche [1968, p. 301, item 556] observes, “There are no ‘facts-in-
themselves, for a sense must always be projected into them before there can be 
‘facts.’”
2
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 36 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol36/iss1/2
3Macintosh, Nietzsche’s Genealogical History
outlook as neutral regarding truth rather than being relativistic 
as S&T contend. Moreover, “Most accounting historians accept 
the subjectivity of historical truth, but this does not mean that 
truth does not exist or that it is not worth looking for … events 
do happen … and for a reason, even if it is an accident” (p. 181). 
But most importantly, for purposes of this essay, they conclude 
that, “We do not believe accounting historians have the author-
ity or are they well situated ‘to address the problems in practice 
and theory today.’ That undertaking is better left to social activ-
ists, contemporary critics, and accounting regulators....Rather, 
his torians should continue to examine, illuminate, and interpret 
the past” (p. 188).
T&O’s stance seems particularly strange given that as aca-
demic researchers, they surely have the authority and as tenured 
accounting professors have the knowledge and intellect to ad-
dress the problems of today’s accounting practice and theory. 
After all, one of the primary roles of universities through their 
academic faculty is to challenge the quandaries and ills of the 
status quo as they see them. This essay, then, takes umbrage at 
their apolitical stance. Richardson [2008, p. 257] recently put it 
well, arguing that accounting historians should aim to be con-
troversial and be attentive to current institutional issues such as 
standard setting, accounting education, and the politics of the 
accounting profession.
THE SITUATION TODAY
The situation today in the financial accounting world is a 
case in point. The promulgated IFASs, the joint effort of the In-
ternational Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the Finan-
cial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), as well as U.S. GAAP, 
appear strange when examined closely. This body of accounting 
rules and concepts seems much more a labyrinth of one-off, 
separate, often incommensurable, and frequently contradictory 
axiomatic statements, which are espoused as universal rules and 
principles for accounting problems and practices more than 
they are a coherent body of knowledge resting on solid founda-
tional, conceptual frameworks. As former FASB chairman Herz 
[2005, p. 4] observed: “The fact is that what we call U.S. GAAP is 
comprised of over 2,000 individual pronouncements by various 
bodies and organizations in a variety of forms.” He describes 
this vast corpus of accounting principles, rules, concepts, regula-
tions, interpretations, implementation guides, etc. as disjointed, 
frequently in conflict, extraordinarily detailed, and complicated, 
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so much so, “that only a rapidly decreasing number of CFO’s 
and professional accountants can fully comprehend all the rules 
and how to apply them.” He also notes that a diverse array of 
public and private bodies, institutions, and committees contrib-
ute to this vast body of official pronouncements.2 “The result,” 
Herz believes, “is a body of official accounting literature that 
is hard to understand and difficult to use. In one word, nuts!” 
(p. 5)!3 Surely, this is a strange situation indeed for one of the 
most important discourses of present-day global capitalism. The 
current joint IASB/FASB concepts and GAAP are fast mirroring 
this state of affairs.
Furthermore, a large corpus of accounting studies has 
uncovered mounds of evidence that earnings management/ 
manipulation practices are widespread globally. Several re-
searchers have documented games that corporate financial 
officers play with investment analysts and capital market players 
[see, for instance, Richardson et al., 2004; Bartov and Mohan-
ran, 2004]. Research has also identified the major means by 
which earnings/manipulation is accomplished, including: struc-
tured transactions [O’Brien, 2005] and negotiations regarding 
contentious reporting issues between corporate financial officers 
and the enterprise’s auditors [Gibbins et al., 2001]. Ironically, 
sophisticated investors like to see some earnings manipulation 
since it is a sign of competent CFOs [Bartov et al., 2002].
Traditional historians tend to be silent on the current state 
of the accounting world, and some might even see the ongoing 
convergence concepts and GAAP projects as progress, whereas 
those subscribing to the genealogical approach would perceive 
them as strange and certainly not progress. A case in point is the 
fact that not so long ago in, say, the mercantile age, merchants 
bought and sold real, material goods (woolen garments, spices, 
wines, foodstuffs, etc.) to which accounting reports unambigu-
ously referred. But today, the traders of stocks and derivatives, 
2 These include the FASB and its predecessors, the Accounting Principles 
Board and the Committee on Accounting Procedures, the Emerging Issues Task 
Force (EITF), and the Accounting Standards Executive Committee of the Ameri-
can Institute of Certified Public Accountants. The Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) alone has a vast number of core rules, including Regulations S-X 
and S-K, more than one hundred specific Staff Accounting Bulletins, nearly fifty 
Financial Reporting Releases, and hundreds of Accounting Series Releases. 
3 Herz [2005, pp. 4-5] points out that “the SEC also proclaims its latest views 
on particular reporting and disclosure matters through speeches and comments 
at EITF and other professional meetings, which, while not official, effectively car-
ry the same weight for anyone trying to comply with all the rules.”
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hedges, swaps, etc., seated in front of a bank of computers and 
telephones, trade trillions upon trillions of Euros, dollars, yen, 
etc. in a vast global, capital-market economy of hyper-real, 
non-material signs, dealing with people they have never met or 
seen, a phenomenon that many experts see as a major cause 
of the current stock market collapse. Surely, this would appear 
to be a very peculiar, even unnatural, turn of events to the me-
dieval merchant who bought and sold real material things and 
who dealt with real people. What is even stranger is that GAAP 
requires accountants to put a valuation on these non-material 
signs and report them on financial statements (i.e., mark-to-
market accounting).4 A genealogical history would bring such 
strangeness into the light. Accounting for deferred income taxes, 
pension liability and expense, and stock options when looked 
at closely also seem strange, and, therefore seem to be good po-
tential targets for genealogical research. The inspiration for ge-
nealogical history comes from the influential work of Friedrich 
Nietzsche (1844-1900).
TRADITIONAL HISTORY
Traditional history can lay claim to four fundamental 
strengths.5 First, it investigates only the real, where evidence of 
the real is verifiable, historical facts. As the eminent historian 
Hobsbawm [1995, p. viii] stated: “The point from which histo-
rians must start, however far from it they may end, is the fund-
amental and, for them, absolutely central distinction between 
established fact and fiction, between historical statements based 
on evidence, and subject to those which are not.” The Spanish 
Inquisition, the French Revolution, World War I, the American 
and British leveling of Iraq in 2003, the Holocaust, the Gulag, 
and the genocidal attacks on the Basque separatists did hap-
pen in real places, to real people, by real people. “Without the 
distinction between what is and what is not so, there can be no 
history … [and] the ability to distinguish between the two [fact 
and fiction] is absolutely fundamental” (pp. viii, 6).
Traditional history also identifies the past as a permanent 
dimension of the human community and consciousness. We car-
ry it around with us as a “sense of the past.” Its patterns tend to 
4 Many observers have seen mark-to-market accounting as a major contribu-
tor to the lending crisis and stock market crash of 2008-2009. 
5 See Carmona et al. [2004] for a detailed comparison of traditional account-
ing history with the new accounting history.
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get reproduced in what we consider to be important about our 
lives. Many walks of life – judiciaries, politicians, bureaucrats, 
members of professions like accounting and law, the military 
– frequently search for historical precedent when making judg-
ments and decisions. Many people today have more in common 
with their forbearers than with their contemporaries. History 
not only illuminates the past, it also throws light on the present. 
“To be a member of any human community is to situate oneself 
with regard to one’s past … the problem for historians is to ana-
lyze the nature of this ‘sense of the past’ in society and to trace 
its changes and transformations” (p. 10). Even when ideologues 
distort or reinvent the past, they retain the sense that the past 
is important. The pull of the past as tradition and continuity is 
strong.
The third strength is that traditional history has much to 
say about contemporary times. It is a storehouse and reposi-
tory of the experiences, the wisdom, and the follies of the past, 
and so it should provide the material for making a better world 
today. While much of the human situation and temperament 
stay about the same from epoch to epoch, much improves when 
lessons from the past are recalled and acted upon. Even when 
people in high places ignore or distort the lessons of history, 
historians must keep trying and act as myth slayers (p. 274). 
History has much to say about the present.
The final strength is that it sees the past, present, and future 
as constituting a continuum. The present is systematically tied 
to the past, and the future is a seamless web of progress even 
though today’s social structures and the patterns of reproduc-
ing them put a limit on the number and kind of things that can 
happen tomorrow. But historians can, if they try, predict social 
trends and perhaps influence in important ways what will hap-
pen in the future. As experts on the past, they should be able to 
provide insights into what possibly might happen. And if these 
possibilities are deemed to be undesirable, it behooves histori-
ans to speak out.
In sum, traditional history is concerned with the investiga-
tion of real events and real people. It holds that the past strongly 
influences the shape of the present, and that we can learn a great 
deal from the experiences, wisdom, and mistakes of the past, 
but only if we pay attention to it. It sees the past, present, and 
future as constituting a seamless web in time. Thus, historians 
can and should predict important trends which might be acted 
upon to help shape a better future. These presuppositions are 
underpinned by the epistemological belief in “the supremacy of 
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evidence.” Traditional historians, then, are wont to make a sharp 
distinction between strictly scientific procedures and rhetorical 
constructions, between fact and fiction. Facts are deemed to be 
statements supported by evidence from primary sources. Second-
ary sources are also important in that they provide support for 
primary sources. Nietzsche, however, had serious reservations 
about the benefits of traditional history for society and for the 
individual.
NIETZSCHE’S GENEALOGY
Nietzsche was wary of the efficacy of traditional history on 
several counts. He worried, for example, that too much focus on 
the great deeds of men of the past would hinder the enhance-
ment of society and the individual, particularly the latter’s 
potential for “overcoming” the present state of affairs and the 
development of his or her own morals. Such reverence would 
serve only to preserve a way of life, not enhance it. He was 
also concerned that excessive reverence for the past leads to a 
forgetfulness of the dark side of mankind’s historical past and 
hampers attempts by men of action to try something new for 
fear of offending some sacred belief [Nietzsche, 1968]. He saw 
history as more than an accurate account of some element in 
the past. Rather, we need history “for the sake of life and action 
… We want to serve history only to the extent that history serves 
life” [Nietzsche, 1983, p. 59]. These reservations led Nietzsche to 
formulate a critical, “effective” history, what he called genealogy.
In The Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche [1956] addressed four 
questions that had haunted him about the provenance of moral 
prejudices. “Under what conditions did man construct the value 
judgments good and evil? And what is their intrinsic worth? 
Have they thus far benefited or retarded mankind? Do they 
betoken misery, curtailment, degeneracy or, on the contrary, 
power, fullness of being, energy, courage in the face of life, and 
confidence in the future?” (p. 156) Underlying these questions 
was a more fundamental puzzle, one that he pursued for most 
of his life. What was the end or purpose of valuing, what was the 
value of values? Nietzsche thought of values as those important 
traditional notions of a particular civilization that are deemed to 
deserve reverence and esteem. Western civilization, for example, 
he observed, has valued good over evil, altruism rather than ego-
ism, truth over falsehood, and individualism over the herd. The 
leading French and English moral philosophers at the time were 
declaring that utilitarianism and altruism were the basic and 
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intrinsic psychological material of human nature and that the 
“good” is what is of personal use along with a selfless concern 
for others. Nietzsche, however, saw such efforts as “a perverse 
and upside-down variety of genealogical hypothesis” (p. 152).
The “English psychologists,” as he called them, made two 
fundamental errors. In the first instance, these “microscopic 
examiners of the soul...glorified and transcendentalized the non-
egotistical instincts of compassion, self-denial, pity, and self-sac-
rifice” (p. 153), treating them as absolute values thus showing, 
“a will that had turned against life” (p.159). They “think unhis-
torically, as is the age-old custom of philosophers” (p.159). In 
contrast, Nietzsche believed that the key to understanding mor-
als involved conducting historical research into the provenance 
of specific values and documenting the major changes in their 
meaning during their descent to the present. Nietzsche’s aim was 
to produce what he called “effective history” by exposing how 
the currently reigning morals of a society are just as suspect and 
unnatural as those that held sway in past eras. A genealogical 
analysis, he believed, would unsettle, de-nature, and de-doxify 
the taken-for-granted meanings of currently prevailing values, 
thus opening spaces for new ways of moralizing.6 He hoped this 
would show the way to overcome the hegemonic effects of the 
currently reigning values, thus enabling the individual to create 
his or her own moral standards.
By tracking the origins of the terms good and bad back in 
time, for example, he hoped to pinpoint their origins and record 
the radical ruptures and reformulations in the meanings attrib-
uted to them over the years. With this aim in mind, Nietzsche 
embarked on his genealogical project. He found evidence that in 
ancient Greek society, these terms merely differentiated two ma-
jor classes – the patrician and plebeian classes. Good was simply 
the aristocracy’s way of life that distanced them from the lower, 
dependent class. “Good,” however, was not good in the sense of 
being superior to “bad.” It was simply a term to distinguish the 
noble from the rest of society. Nor did “bad” signify bad in any 
disrespectful, disdainful, or disreputable sense. The good (the 
noble) needed the bad (the rest) and the bad needed the good.
The term “good,” however, did indicate the power and 
6 Rorty [1989] followed Nietzsche in this line of thought to develop his phi-
losophy of striving for “new final vocabularies” while recognizing that, ironically, 
a liberal pragmatist would recognize that it would not be “final” but rather one 
stage of an endless series of new final vocabularies. He believed that to change our 
talk is to change what we are. 
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wealth of the aristocrats and even more so a character trait and 
a temperament thought to be typical of that class. Good referred 
to the characteristic spirit of a person who has a true reality and 
who has nobility. Moreover, good as a trait was not for Nietzsche 
some thing-in-itself, existing out there beyond language that 
could be discovered by philosophers or scientists. Rather, it was 
a term that came into being as a result of the handiwork of the 
high-minded nobility, who simply decreed their own actions, 
and thus themselves, to be the good. “The basic concept [the 
good] is always noble in the hierarchical, class sense, and from 
this developed … the concept good embracing nobility of mind, 
spiritual distinction” (p. 162). In parallel with this, the term bad 
merely indicated “the notions common, plebian, base” (p. 162). 
Importantly, however, for the ruling class, “The lordly right of 
bestowing names is such that one would almost be justified in 
seeing the origin of language itself as an expression of the rul-
ers’ power. They say, ‘this or that’; they seal off each thing and 
action with a sound and thereby take symbolic possession of it” 
(p. 162). The ruling ideas are the ideas of the rulers, not of some 
permanent, transcendental, metaphysical doctrine.
In further support of the claim that good and bad originally 
were merely descriptive as opposed to value-laden, Nietzsche 
pointed to the German words schlect (bad) and schlict (simple). 
For a long time, the first term was used interchangeably with 
the second “without any contemptuous connotation as yet, 
merely to designate the commoner as opposed to the nobleman” 
(p. 162). Much later, in the early part of the 19th century, the 
meaning of these terms had somehow changed to take on their 
present-day connotations. Good and bad became hierarchical, 
with good superior to bad.
This value-laden hierarchy, Nietzsche observed, came into 
being as the handiwork of those holding the upper hand in the 
social order. For example, in previous European eras, the con-
querors’ own physical characteristics were peremptorily desig-
nated as good and those of the vanquished as bad. In pre-Aryan 
Italy, as a case in point, the original settlers were much darker in 
skin and hair than were their blond, Aryan conquerors (p. 164). 
Similarly, the Gaelic name Fingal (from the French term fin that 
signified “fine”) was a term for the fair-haired invaders of Ireland 
as opposed to the dark, black-haired, indigenous population (p. 
164). The former saw themselves as noble and good and deemed 
the indigenous people as malus. In such cases, the conquerors 
identified good with their own physical characteristics and bad 
with those of the suppressed. What was decreed to be good or 
9
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bad later came to be “naturalized” in virtue of the current rulers’ 
power positions. Nietzsche [1968] did not attribute this to any 
utilitarian or altruistic psychological traits, but rather to their 
will-to-power.
These meanings took another radical rupture in ancient Is-
rael when a “priestly system of valuations branched off from the 
aristocratic and developed into its opposite” (Nietzsche, 1956, 
p. 166). This priestly aristocracy had come into prominence in 
opposition to the warrior caste who placed a high value on traits 
such as strong physique, exuberant health, and chivalry, and 
who savored “combat, adventure, the chase, dance, war games, 
etc.” (p. 167). In contrast, the priests decreed that the under-
privileged, the poor, the powerless, the sick, the ugly, and the 
impotent were the truly blessed and worthy of God’s grace. 
The noble and mighty were now deemed to be avaricious, vain, 
cruel, and, consequently, evil and damned. Only the wretched of 
the earth were worthy of living in paradise with God. With this 
cunning rhetorical move, the priests had turned the tables on 
the warrior caste. What previously had been taken to be good 
became evil; what was previously taken to be bad was now good.
Nietzsche saw the Israeli priestly caste as the perpetrators 
of this radical reversal. They had set the stage for the gospel 
of “love made flesh” with the coming of the redeemer Jesus of 
Nazareth “who brought blessing and victory to the poor, the 
sick, the sinners of the earth … what could equal in debilitating 
narcotic power the symbol of the ‘holy cross,’ the ghostly para-
dox of a crucified god, the unspeakable, cruel mystery of God’s 
self-crucifixion for the benefit of mankind? One thing is certain, 
that in this sign Israel has by now triumphed over all other, 
nobler values” (p. 169). Weakness was now merit and strength 
pernicious.
In the face of this and other such critical reversals in the 
reigning values of a culture or of a civilization, Nietzsche came 
to some momentous, if startling, conclusions, ones which con-
tradicted traditional philosophical thinking. He argued that 
there is no value without an evaluation. But since valuation is an 
act of will that proceeds from a particular perspective, it follows 
that, “Through esteeming alone is there value” [Nietzsche, 1973, 
pp. 1, 15]. Thus, Nietzsche’s great insight, “Whatever has value 
in our world now does not have value itself, according to its 
nature – nature is always value-less, but has been given value at 
some time as a present – and it was we who gave and bestowed 
it” [Nietzsche, 1974, p. 301].
Nietzsche, then, saw values as the result of humans willing 
10
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them into existence. They are created by humans who, in virtue 
of their “will-to-power,” wish to preserve, maintain, and hold 
sway over a particular way of life. Importantly for genealogical 
researchers, values are linguistic objects that exist in their own 
right and can be studied as such. Such research can discover 
the origins of specific values, document the specific conditions 
under which they made their appearance, and trace their radical 
ruptures and reformulations during their descent to the present 
day. It can serve to de-naturalize and de-doxify the currently 
taken-for-granted dominant status of reigning values of the 
status quo. Thus, spaces can be opened up for alternative ways 
of seeing the present, for making it seem as strange as previous 
eras look to us today.7 Foucault [1977] endorsed and extended 
Nietzsche’s effective history perspective.
FOUCAULT’S NIETZSCHEAN GENEALOGY
In his essay Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, Foucault [1977] 
investigates in some depth and endorses Nietzsche’s notion of 
genealogy, especially his various uses of Ursprung as the original 
basis of morality and his idea of effective history.8 He agrees with 
Nietzsche’s conclusion that there is no lofty, original primor-
dial, pristine, timeless, and essentialist essences at the moment 
that the idea of morality first appeared, as well as ideals such 
as justice, truth, and reason that are vital for a culture. Rather, 
if we as genealogists “listen” to history, we find that “they have 
no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal 
fashion” (p. 142). For example, instead of “divine birth” when 
humans “emerged dazzling from the hands of a creator,” we find 
that, “historical beginnings are lowly” (p. 143). Zarathustra’s 
monkey, “who jumps along behind him, pulling at his coattails” 
(p. 143), reminds us that we are descended from the apes. The 
historical development of humanity is merely a series of inter-
pretations and discontinuities. Thus, Foucault came to believe, 
“History becomes ‘effective’ to the degree that it introduces 
discontinuity into our very being ... and it will not permit itself 
to be transported by a voiceless obstinacy toward a millennial 
7 The current state of accounting includes a host of topics amenable to ge-
nealogical historical research, including, for example, the widespread earnings 
manipulation phenomenon; accounting for deferred taxes and deferred pension 
expense; and accounting for certain derivative option securities using other com-
prehensive income accounts. 
8 I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting the inclusion of 
Foucault’s genealogical, effective history.
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ending. It will uproot its traditional foundations and relentlessly 
disrupt its pretended continuity” (p. 154). The history of human-
kind has neither pristine, original essence nor any final, eternal, 
destiny resting place guided by metaphysical fixed laws.
Such a position led Foucault (p. 146) to refuse the search 
for origins. Instead, he saw that the genealogist’s task:
... is to maintain passing events in their proper dis-
persion; it is to identify the accidents, the minute de-
viations – or conversely, the complete reversals – the 
errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations 
that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and 
have value for us; it is to discover that truth or being do 
not lie at the root of what we know and what we are, 
but the exteriority of accidents.
Mahon [1992, p. 112] neatly sums it up, “The genealogist sees 
the present state of affairs and present needs as another episode; 
not the result of a meaningful development, but the result of 
struggle and the relations of force and domination.” As Foucault 
said in an interview with Simon [1971, p. 192], “It is a question 
basically of presenting a critique of our own time, based on ret-
rospective analysis, a critique of those systems within which we 
are trapped.” Effective history, for Foucault, as with Nietzsche, 
has value as both a diagnostic and a curative critique of the 
present.9
GENEALOGISTS’ CRITIQUE OF TRADITIONAL HISTORY
Genealogists are wary of traditional historians on several 
fronts. They see them as structuralists who attempt to excavate 
the large-scale patterns (the gestalt) of some kind of great and 
enduring forces at work that persist across time and circum-
stance operating below the surface of the life world.10 That is to 
9 Foucault’s Nietzsche, Genealogy, History [1977] essay signaled his episte-
mological turn from archeology to genealogy. See especially pp. 154-157 for his 
ontological and epistemological presuppositions regarding genealogical, effective 
history and how to conduct it. 
10 Structuralists of all kinds hold that structures, the organizing properties or 
blueprints of any system, are ubiquitous in both nature and culture. Moreover, 
they believe that everything that is not indivisible in its very nature exists as a 
complex whole, amenable to analysis of its constituent parts. Each part has no 
meaning on its own but only by virtue of its relationship to all the other parts and 
to the master plan of the system. So the surface behavior of the system, includ-
ing its enduring and discernable patterns, is controlled by the below-the-surface 
structures, its pre-established harmony. See Sturrock, 1986, for an excellent com-
parison of structuralism with post-structuralism.
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say, they try to discern the deep underlying continuities, those 
forces which determine how we have progressed and which 
explain the present. Genealogists eschew such endeavors as con-
trived fictions. Thus, genealogists oppose “the Augustinian view 
of history as recording a divinely scripted linear and teleological 
sequence of events … and unfolding story with a beginning (the 
Creation), a middle (the Incarnation) and an eventual end (the 
Last Judgment). So the traditionalist integrates what otherwise 
might seem like unconnected events as being moved by the 
hand of God” [Prado, 2000, p. 33]. In general, the traditional-
ist looks to excavate below-the-surface principles that deter-
mine and  explain the present and its teleological progression. 
 Genealogists, however, abjure such a position, calling it “doing 
metaphysics.” They repudiate ideas, for example, that behind 
the unfolding of historical events is some kind of guiding hand 
(e.g., God, the laws of the market, or reason) that animates hu-
mans and determines the flow of history. Instead, they focus on 
what can be seen on the surface.
Genealogists also see traditionalists as seeking to restore 
an unbroken continuity to history that purports to harmonize 
past events and personages into some kind of a meta-narrative 
featuring a discursive, seamless web stretching into the future 
by revealing how some hidden forces (such as progress and 
rationality) putatively illuminate the present. Yet, they can only 
achieve this, genealogists argue, by imposing some kind of a 
predetermined form on the vicissitudes, disparities, and haphaz-
ard happenings of the past and assimilating them into a coher-
ent, discursive formation that takes into account and treats as 
significant only those events and personages that fit snugly into 
its meta-narrative. Thus, the past gets frozen into a sequence of 
integrated and determinant events. As Foucault [1971, p. 154] 
contends, “The forces operating in history are not controlled by 
destiny or regulative mechanisms, but respond to haphazard 
conflicts.”
Genealogists object to any such consecration. They see 
such efforts only as a handy way to compile disparate factors 
with no apparent interrelatedness into a logical net that can 
only be accomplished by the retrospective imposition of some 
grand historical interpretation. Instead, the genealogist wants 
to conduct historical research as critique by exposing the unrec-
ognized  operation of power in the everyday lives of individuals. 
As Mahon [1992, p. 14] neatly puts it, “Nietzsche’s genealogy is a 
unique form of critique which recognizes that the things, values, 
and events of our present experience have been constituted his-
13
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torically, discursively, and practically. Genealogy is an attempt 
to lay bare that constitution and its consequences; it reveals the 
historical, discursive, and practical conditions of existence of 
such things, values, and events.”
A genealogy of the moral value “virtue,” for example, might 
begin with the modernistic liberal view that equates virtue 
with rational altruism (a major good) and which is deemed to 
be the opposite of naturalistic egoism (a major vice). Going 
back in time, for early New Testament Christians, faith, hope, 
charity, love, humility, and poverty were characteristics of the 
virtuous person. For the Greeks like Aristotle, the trained mind, 
 phronesis, was the main virtue that made it possible for the 
noble gentleman to exercise other virtues – friendship, mag-
nanimity, munificence, wealth, and high social status. In con-
trast with the New Testament belief, riches for Aristotle were a 
virtue and humility a vice. Before that, in Homeric times, virtue 
(aretai) meant excellence in physical strength and loyalty to 
the king without regard for the needs and feelings of other 
 humans not of the kingdom. Nietzsche saw these radical 
changes in the meaning of virtue as the handiwork of powerful 
elites, in each case as a consequence of the human will-to-power 
instinct.
In the final analysis, Nietzsche called for genealogy to be 
life affirming. His great concern was not just to understand the 
way people narrate and explain their past, but more to evalu-
ate the effects on their own lives. In reflecting on the value of 
historical narratives, he concluded that such knowledge should 
be the source of invigoration and action in the present, not 
merely “a costly super fluidity and a luxury” [Nietzsche, 1983, p. 
59]. Genealogical history, then, was for Nietzsche, as well as for 
Foucault, a critical diagnostic of the present relations of power. 
As Mahon [1992, p. 101] sums it up, “Nietzsche’s genealogy, 
then, can be viewed as a diagnostic history of the present. The 
genealogist traces the history of the present in order to under-
mine its self-evidences and to open possibilities for the enhance-
ment of life.” Foucault [1977] extended this idea, arguing that 
an historical event (such as a treaty, a reign, a battle, etc.) was 
not so much the cause of some change, but rather was the re- 
versal of the relationship of forces, the usurpation of power. 
“The forces operating in history are not controlled by destiny or 
regulative mechanisms, but rather respond to haphazard con-
flicts” (p. 154). Two examples of genealogical, effective history 
follow.
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WILLIAMS’ GENEALOGY OF  
BRITISH DISCOURSE ON SLAVERY
Williams’ [1994] historical account of the radical shift in 
the British discourse regarding slavery in the Caribbean in the 
17th and 18th centuries provides a vivid case in point. Williams 
followed the tenets of traditional history but also produced a 
genealogical critique of the currently prevailing view that hu-
manitarian impulses were behind the abolitionist movement. He 
identified his primary sources in his bibliography (pp. 262-266), 
including Colonial Office papers; correspondence and memo-
randa of important people, such as leading statesmen; statistics 
compiled by ship captains; minute books of special government 
committees; and printed sources, such as the Hansard records 
of parliamentary debates and reports of special committees 
of the Privy Council. Williams’ bibliography also includes two 
kinds of secondary sources – contemporary and modern. These 
include material such as the writings of leading mercantilists; 
sundry pamphlet series; bibliographies of key figures; scholarly 
academic theses, essays, and lecture notes consisting of “careful 
analysis of original material” (p. 268); sundry “resources” in the 
British Museum and the Indian Office Library; Caribbean his-
tory books; comprehensive dictionaries; and even those novels 
which “reveal a profound understanding of the triangular trade 
and its importance to British capitalism” (p. 269). 
Using these sources, Williams debunks the conventional 
moral progress historical account of Britain’s slavery in the West 
Indies and other parts of the Americas. His genealogy identified 
the discontinuity of British capitalism from mercantilist capital-
ism to technology and machine-based industrial capitalism with 
its accompanying radical rupture in Britain’s moralistic rhetoric 
regarding slavery when the industrial revolution’s captains of 
industry become England’s rulers. Williams’ genealogy shows 
how materialistic, economic considerations, not idealistic moral 
injunctions as is currently widely held, underpinned the radical 
reformulation of the British moral discourse regarding slavery. 
Thus, Williams’ genealogy served as a much needed, myth-
slaying exercise.11
AN ACCOUNTING EXAMPLE
Macintosh et al. [2000] present a Baudrillardian-based gene-
11 Hobsbawm [1997, pp. 274-275] advocates myth slaying by historians in 
spite of the difficulties such endeavors entail.
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alogy of the radical shifts in the accounting signs of income (i.e., 
profit) since feudal times to the present.12 Baudrillard identified 
three “orders” or eras of simulation (counterfeit, production or 
industrial, and simulacra) that followed the feudal period and 
four distinct phases of the sign to referent relationships that 
were typical of each era. In the feudal era, the sign was a reflec-
tion of a deep, solid reality. It was a “good” appearance in the 
sense that it is a faithful and transparent representation. This 
was also the case, Macintosh et al. [2000] argue, for accounting 
in feudal times where profit (income) reflected the net result of 
liquidation proceeds of separate ventures. This was profit in the 
true sense of the word rather than income, not a periodic calcu-
lation from continuing operations.
In the counterfeit era, the sign became an imitation of natu-
ral objects (like stucco and the emerging “midldin” class with its 
natural rights), and so it masked the absence of such a reality. 
The appearance of the non-terminal, joint-stock company (e.g., 
the British East India Company) led to the idea of the business 
as a going concern. The result was the introduction of nominal 
(not real) accounts in the form of accruals and deferrals, radi-
cally changing accounting technique. Accounting had entered 
Baudrillard’s order of the counterfeit with the sign of income 
becoming a counterfeit, an imitation of the feudal era’s liqui-
dation proceeds. Henceforth, income signs could only play at 
being real. They no longer referred to a real, material economic 
territory.
This problematic relationship changed dramatically in 
the late 18th century with the appearance of the production or 
industrial era simulacra [Baudrillard, 1988, p. 137]. A whole 
new generation of signs-to-objects relationships accompanied 
the rise of the industrial revolution. The relationship between 
them was no longer either a good reflection of the object or a 
counterfeit of it. The key feature was the mass serial produc-
tion of identifiable objects that had no equivalent in nature. The 
sign versus object relationship imploded, and it was no longer 
possible to differentiate between them. The object became the 
sign and the sign became the object. Absentee, depersonal-
ized ownership came into prominence and accounting’s focus 
shifted from measuring the entrepreneurial proprietor’s return 
to a return to depersonalized capital. The income sign became 
a standardized, serially produced commodity in its own right, 
and its principal value was to facilitate the market exchange of 
12 See also, Macintosh [2005, ch. 4].
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depersonalized capital. The income sign had slipped free from 
any original object.
The nature of the income sign experienced another radical 
rupture and reformulation with the advent of today’s order of 
simulation. Its chief characteristic is the production and con-
sumption of signs (simulacra, images, models, etc.), which are 
detached from any real material realm. Instead, they circulate 
in the realm of what Baudrillard [1988] calls “hyper-reality” 
which has become more important in many respects than the 
real of real material objects. Regarding the income sign, invest-
ment analysts look to reports of income to predict a company’s 
future earnings. Simultaneously, the company’s accounting 
officers look to the analysts’ forecasts and “manage” reported 
income to meet these forecasts, and, in turn, the market capital-
izes analysts’ earnings into stock prices. The company’s reported 
income, the analysts’ forecasting models, and the investors’ valu-
ation models circulate simultaneously in the hyper-real financial 
realm in a Möbius strip-like fashion.
Yet, today, income reports, especially earnings per share, are 
treated as what in post-structural terms is called “the sign-of-
signs” – a virtual “transcendental signifier.” Such a sign-of-signs/
transcendental signifier refers to any concept that is taken to 
act as the foundation of a system of discourse and which forms 
the axis or hub around which all other notions and signs rotate 
and to which they refer. As Eagleton [1983, p. 131] explains, it 
is “the meaning of meanings, the lynch pin or fulcrum of the 
whole thought system of discourse, the sign around which all 
others would obediently reflect.” The income sign today is such 
a signifier. It is generally taken to be the most important piece of 
accounting information that organizations provide to the capital 
market and others. Capital markets rely on this sign, taking it to 
be a fundamental indicator of the underlying economic reality 
of the firm for use as an important signal when estimating the 
market value of the company’s stock. But, as Macintosh et al.’s 
[2000] research indicates, the income sign no longer refers to 
any “real” economic income or profit. Rather, it is a prime ex-
ample of what Baudrillard [1988. p. 166] calls “the generation of 
a model of a real without origin or reality; a hyper-real in which 
the territory no longer precedes the map … it is the map that 
genders the territory.”
The upshot is that the financial markets are to an important 
extent ungrounded. McGoun [1997, p. 116] captures the idea 
in this fashion, suggesting that the stock market “is a hall of 
mirrors where reflections of reflections and images constitute 
17
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the only reality that matters.” In Baudrillard’s terminology, 
the financial market is a hyper-real economy that floats almost 
unconnected to the real economy of the production and con-
sumption of goods and services, as well as unconnected to the 
real people who produce and consume these commodities. In 
this hyper-real economy, the income sign circulates detached 
from material objects and ideals, such as any true income of the 
enterprise. Given this view, the global capital market today is 
a free-floating phenomenon with no solid underpinnings. This 
genealogical research de-naturalizes and de-doxifies the gener-
ally held perspective of accounting reports of income, and, most 
importantly, it brings into the light this very strange and what 
should be worrisome state of affairs of accounting.
EARLY FOUCAULDIAN ACCOUNTING STUDIES
The idea of genealogy as a means for critiquing the  present, 
a vital strand in both Nietzsche and Foucault’s corpus of writ-
ings, however, somehow gets lost in much of the accounting 
history literature. The not insignificant body of published 
Foucauldian-type accounting historical genealogies is a case in 
point. A brief tour of some of the major cited papers along these 
lines provides support for this contention. This body of account-
ing research flourished in the mid-to-late 1980s and continues 
sporadically today.
A prime example is Loft’s [1986] genealogy of the rise of 
management accounting in the U.K. and the appearance of the 
Institute of Cost Accounting as a bone fide professional organiza-
tion in the early part of the 20th century. Her research revealed 
how cost accounting arose to this status, not merely as tech-
nique for aiding decision makers, as the conventional view has 
it, but more as an important force in the British government’s 
discursive initiative to reconstruct Britain as an efficient nation 
with efficient firms and efficient workers. While her narrative is 
highly enlightening in this respect, it says little or nothing about 
the power effects of this use of cost accounting on the employ-
ees in British organizations. A number of other studies followed, 
taking their cues from Foucault’s surveillance, discipline, pun-
ishment, and normalization thesis and his excavation of the ap-
pearance of carceral techniques that spread throughout today’s 
institutions of all kinds. These studies, like Loft’s, however, come 
across as not only “un-Foucauldian” in tone, but also politically 
bland and lacking in critical edge.
Hoskin and Macve [1986, 1988], for example, traced the 
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“disciplinary grammatocentric” practices installed at West Point 
in the early 1800s and later taken on board seriously by the 
management cadres of U.S. railroads to the examining prac-
tices in the new, elite medieval universities. They concluded that 
these practices stemmed neither from market forces nor as an 
offshoot of financial accounting’s external reporting methods, as 
other historians such as Johnson and Kaplan [1987] would have 
it. Hoskin and Macve seemed almost to celebrate Foucauldian 
disciplinary practices, commenting that they both constrain and 
enable behavior. In another seminal study mobilizing Foucault’s 
power/knowledge disciplinary regimes of truth, Miller and 
O’Leary [1987] documented the appearance of the calculable 
worker-employee in the early part of the 20th century when 
standard costing and budgeting practices combined with the 
widespread instantiation of scientific management practices to 
render the individual constantly visible. They concluded that the 
“accounting gaze” enmeshed all in a ubiquitous web of calcula-
tive techniques, rendering them conspicuously visible while at 
work. The government at the time also embraced these practices 
with enthusiasm. Hopwood [1987] reported how management 
accounting and control systems in three different organizations 
actively shaped vital organizational practices rather than merely 
providing ex-post reporting. Preston [1992, p. 96] reported how 
hospital administrators in the U.K. mobilized accounting dis-
courses to “impose a new economic order upon the medical.” 
The benign conclusions of these uncritical “critical accounting 
studies” are in retrospect strange given Foucault’s lamenting of 
the widespread adoption in western society of these carceral-like 
practices. Walsh and Stewart [1993], comparing the change in 
management practices between a woolen manufactory (1681-
1703) and a cotton factory (1800-1812), drawing on Foucault’s 
[1979] panopticon notion, concluded that in the latter case, ac-
counting (particularly cost accounting) played a fundamental 
role in the emergence of new organizational and managerial 
practices in controlling factory activities and the work force by 
and from a central office, and that “this role which accounting 
played in enabling the emergence of organization is fundamen-
tal to an understanding of accounting and the role it plays in 
organizations” [Walsh and Stewart, 1993, p. 799]. While Walsh 
and Stewart identify a radical change in management control 
practices, they appear to see it as progress. These works seem 
to be a far cry from Foucault and Nietzsche’s call for effective, 
genealogical historical research.
Moreover, critiques of such studies also are uncritical of 
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the contemporary widespread adoption of these practices. For 
example, Tyson [1990] convincingly challenged Hoskin and 
Macve’s contention that accounting controls were unable to 
attain disciplinary power over labor until a West Point-trained 
managerial component had been established at the Springfield 
Armory. Tyson’s careful documentation of prior events estab-
lished that social and economic factors better explained the 
fundamental changes in accountability systems at the armory 
in the 1840s. However, as with Hoskin and Macve’s research, his 
critique provides no critical leverage on the widespread applica-
tion of coercive, disciplinary surveillance and punishment in 
today’s factories, especially those in so-called emerging market 
economies.
In fact, such benign conclusions came as a surprise to 
Moore [1991], a critical literary theorist, who carried out an 
extensive review of the body of Foucauldian critical account-
ing studies, comparing them to critical legal studies. He con-
cluded that while some provided a rich Foucauldian “account 
of accounting,” their deployment of Foucault’s ideas seemed 
blandly procedural.13 Moreover, and surprisingly for him, he 
also observed that they seemed to embrace the effects of power 
that came along with accounting controls in an unqualified 
and almost enthusiastic manner, depicting them “as a positive 
enabling organizing force” (p. 773). Moore criticizes Miller and 
O’Leary “who somehow miss the tyranny pursued into the tini-
est details and can only conclude their paper by valorizing the 
current state of power in accounting” (p. 773).
Such sanguine Foucauldian research seems quite at odds 
with Nietzsche’s call for conducting genealogical research for 
the enhancement of the individual and society at large and with 
Foucault’s [1979, pp. 217, 228] observation that today, “We are 
much less Greeks than we believe. We are neither in the am-
phitheatre, nor on the stage, but in the panoptic machine … Is 
it surprising that prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, 
hospitals, which all resemble prisons.” Elsewhere, he observes 
that all the carceral apparatuses have become a major function 
of today’s society (p. 304):
The judges of normality are everywhere. We are in 
the society of the master-judge, the doctor-judge, the 
educator-judge, the ‘social worker’ judge; it is on them 
that the universal reign of the normative is based; and 
13 See Neimark [1990] for a critique of these studies that she labels as “neo-
conservative.”
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each individual wherever he may be may find himself, 
subjects to it his body, his gestures, his behaviour, his 
aptitudes, his achievements. The carceral network, in 
its compact or disseminated forms, with its systems of 
insertion, distribution, surveillance, observations, has 
been the greatest support, in modern society, of normal-
izing power.
Clearly, Foucault did not celebrate this eventuality. More recent 
research studies indicate that this benign tone has not changed 
much in two decades. Recent historical accounting research in 
Europe (especially in Italy, Portugal, and Spain) has witnessed 
a growing interest in Foucauldian-based studies, particularly by 
younger scholars.14 Hopefully, this essay will encourage them 
to take a more critical stance than the earlier studies discussed 
above.
RECENT EXAMPLES
The study by Busco et al. [2006] is a case in point. They 
provide an historical account of the 1994 takeover of the Italian 
state-owned company Nuovo Pignone (NP), a large engineering 
firm known for its quality products and profitability, by the gi-
ant, global multinational General Electric Corporation (GE). GE 
executives moved rapidly in what one NP executive later called 
a “blitzkrieg” attack to install the “GE Way” into NP, relying 
on three major initiatives. First, they installed GE’s exhaustive, 
comprehensive, and no-nonsense financial and management 
control system that extended from the top of the organization 
to the very bottom layers. (In fact, the first three GE executives 
to arrive at NP were the CFO, a high-level financial planner, and 
a corporate auditor.) Second, GE’s widely acclaimed Six Sigma 
program was rapidly instituted throughout NP. Third, GE execu-
tives initiated an intensive, company-wide retraining program at 
NP, similar to its well-publicized Crotonville training sessions in 
the U.S., including “waves of communication and training” that 
washed over the entire organization, focusing on financial and 
market performance at all levels.15 The financial controls shone 
14 I am indebted to the co-editor, Richard Fleischman, for pointing this out 
to me
15 “The resources invested in NP to communicate the GE Way were massive, 
and the communication was endemic; ‘It follows you everywhere even in the toi-
let’ one employee reported” [Busco et al., p, 29]. Schein [2004], the well-known 
organizational culture theorist, compared the slogans and rhetoric of the Croton-
ville training to wartime brainwashing.
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a spotlight on financial performance; the Six Sigma program fo-
cused on quality of operations; and the training programs aimed 
at instilling the GE Way and its values into all employees.
Busco et al. seem to celebrate GE’s modus operandi that 
produces double-digit increases in reported earnings every year. 
They conclude, “the new organizational practices based on the 
vocabulary of accounting and measurement … contributed to 
the constitution and diffusion of a redefined sense of trust and 
security” (p. 38). In order to do so, they seem to “forget” the de-
humanizing side of GE’s governance and controls. The GE Way 
included, for example, socially constructing each NP employee 
as either a “hi pot” (high potential) or “blocker” (those locals 
who impede change and who are dismissed). GE’s moral ethos 
was clearly articulated in other media in no uncertain terms 
by CEO Welch.16 His motto declared, “Control your destiny or 
someone else will.”17 Presumably, this someone else was Welch. 
A forceful injunction, “Change or Die” reinforced his shibboleth. 
Yet, employees feared being fired if any of its lines of business 
failed to be first or second in its industry. Moreover, “The GE 
Way of Life” demanded that managers be mean and lean, meet 
their numbers, improve operations continuously, achieve high 
growth in sales and profits, and not resist. These words betray 
GE and Welch’s staunch advocacy of neoclassical economics 
with its one-dimensional, self-interested, and atomistic behav-
ing subject. GE’s managers and employees around the world, 
including those at NP, were deemed to be narrowly self-serving 
and utility-maximizing subjects, homo economicus. Busco et 
al.’s traditional historical account is totally void of any critical 
strand, whereas a genealogical approach would highlight the 
radical ruptures in NP’s social practices and conditions, expos-
ing its dubious moral conditions.
The excellent, careful, and insightful accounting history 
articles about the Spanish Royal Tobacco Factory (RTF) circa 
mid-and-early 19th century by Carmona et al. [1997, 2002] and 
by Carmona and Gutiérrez [2005], documenting the disciplin-
ary practices of the RTF, are instructive regarding effective his-
tory. In the first two articles, the authors seem almost to adopt a 
positive, progressive view of such practices: “These new spatial 
configurations, coupled with new administrative and account-
ing practices constituted a powerful regime of surveillance and 
control over space and operators/foremen” [Carmona et al., 
16 See Tichy and Sherman, [1993], Stewart [1999], and Surowiecki [2000].
17 This is the title of the Tichy and Sherman book.
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2002, p. 272]. They also conclude, “This influx of accounting 
practices which reached deeper into factory space than ever 
before  demonstrates the remarkable powerful role that account-
ing practices can play in organizations” (p. 273). Carmona et al. 
[1997, p. 444] seem to endorse such practices: “Once available 
as a micro-technology [of discipline and surveillance], account-
ing opens up new possibilities thorough which work practices 
and power relations can be renegotiated and refined.” They do 
conclude, however, that, “the widely held contention that ac-
counting is nothing more than a mundane and neutral technol-
ogy … is not only questionable but unsustainable.” As Sy and 
Tinker [2005] observe, however, such research ignores and thus 
erases the social conflicts of the past and present and does not 
constitute effective history
Carmona and Gutiérrez [2005] provide an example of how 
accounting historical research can mount a critique of the 
present. They preface their article with an email exchange that 
exposes the Nike Corporation’s aversion to having its overseas 
suppliers referred to as “sweatshops.” The article goes on to 
document the RTF’s outsourcing production to Catholic orders 
of nuns reporting, “Our archival research reveals that the dis-
ciplinary practices were deployed across the various layers of 
the chain of command: nunneries were subject to surveillance 
through accounting controls” (p. 897). The article points out 
how the nuns then came under the gaze of two disciplinary re-
gimes – the Church and the RTF (p. 900):
In summary, results from this investigation indicate 
that external sourcing of cigarette manufacturing to 
poor Catholic nuns was motivated by the juxtaposition 
of factors like the deterrence of gender conflicts within 
the RTF, exploitation of potentials enshrined in the dis-
ciplinary tradition of nunneries and prisons, and access 
to a cheaper labour force, as well as the political inten-
tion of the Royal House of signaling its partnership 
with the Catholic Church in the context of an absolutist 
regime. Such determinates, we argue, sharply contrast-
ed with the discourse that motivated the concession 
of cigarette manufacturing to nuns on the grounds of 
royal compassion.
They conclude with a call for historical research that brings 
into the light the role of accounting as a public rationalization 
discourse that mystifies the power/knowledge surveillance and 
punishment mechanisms, especially accounting ones, embed-
ded in management practices that are “increasingly applied in 
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today’s business” (p. 900). Their article illustrates how account-
ing history research can open up spaces for understanding how 
effective accounting historical research can de-naturalize and 
de-divinize the present widespread practice of outsourcing to 
exploit cheap labor locations around the globe.
CONCLUSION
This essay argued that accounting history research could 
benefit in relevance if more accounting history researchers pre-
sented critiques of the current state of authoritative accounting, 
GAAP, theory, and practice. The essay compared traditional his-
tory with Nietzsche and Foucault’s effective history and provided 
an example of the latter in the case of Nietzsche’s genealogy of 
the radical shifts over the centuries in the morals of western 
civilization. It presented two dramatic examples of effective, ge-
nealogical history. Williams’ genealogy of the shift in the moral 
discourse of slavery in Britain from the mercantile capitalism 
to the advent of industrial capitalism thus debunked the idea 
that abolition came about as result of high moral standards. And 
Mac intosh et al.’s accounting example of the radical ruptures 
and shifts in the nature of accounting reports of income from 
feudal times to the present exposes the strangeness of current 
income reports. It offered a critique of some of the early Fou-
cauldian genealogies of accounting and of a recent history by 
Busco et al. [2006] of GE’s dubious modus operandi in taking 
over companies around the globe. Surely, the massive muddle 
of IASB/FASB concepts and U.S. GAAP, as well as the dehuman-
izing gaze of management accounting systems, do not represent 
progress.
The essay concludes with a plea for traditional accounting 
historians to consider adopting genealogical, effective history 
as a way to mobilize critiques which challenge and refute the 
idea of progress in both financial and managerial accounting 
wisdom and practices. Such research efforts might open up 
spaces for new accounting vocabularies as proposed by Rorty 
[1989] and respond to Sy and Tinker’s [2005] call to address in 
a meaningful way the quandaries of present-day accounting. 
Clearly, capital-market (i.e., informational perspective) account-
ing researchers are not wont to address and critique the current 
state of accounting and the accounting profession, implicitly, 
at least, invoking the dictums and ideology of objective, neutral 
scientific epistemology. Such research continues to follow Ball 
and Brown’s [1968] decades-old call merely to investigate the as-
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sociation of an accounting variable (e.g., abnormal earnings an-
nouncements) with an economic variable (e.g., abnormal stock 
market prices), drawing on very large computer data bases of 
accounting reports and security prices.
Accounting history research, in contrast, has the potential 
to launch critiques of the current state of accounting by adopt-
ing “effective” accounting history research. More than that, the 
task of genealogy “is to become a curative science” [Foucault, 
1977, p. 256]. Effective history holds out the possibilities for 
such an eventuality. Finally, in the larger scheme of things, per-
haps it is time to shift accounting’s discursive formations from 
the discourse of maximizing shareholder wealth to one of hu-
man solidarity and concern for community and an abatement of 
cruelty as Rorty [1989] advocates.
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